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Economic crisis threatens Suharto reign 
Deep crisis in the Indonesian economy has 
led to strong criticisms of President 
Suharto for failing to provide leadership 
when it is most needed. With a presidential 
election due in March there are now open 
calls for Suharto to stand down. East 
Timor's future is bound up in the outcome. 
The instability in Indonesia's economy was set in train by investors' reactions to a budget 
which, according to the Financial Times on 9 
January, 'openlyflout[ed] targets laid down by 
the IMF'. On 8January the country's currency, 
the rupiah, tumbled to a new low-10,000 to the 
US dollar, a quarter of its 1997 value. Panic set 
in among investors, banks and financial insti-
tutions, and among the general public. 
Political discontent 
Although a US$33 billion bail-out deal was 
agreed, the crisis has led to calls for Suharto to 
move aside, some from people previously loyal 
to the first family such as Ami en Rais, the leader 
of the Muslim organisation Muhammadiyah. 
The National Brotherhood Foundation 
suggested that the People 's Consultative 
Assembly, the state organ empowered to elect 
the president, should not re-nominate Suharto, 
although he has confirmed he will be standing. 
Similar views have been echoed across the world 
in leading financial newspapers and journals, 
such as the Financial Times. 
However, Suharto is unlikely to let go easily 
and, if his nomination is supported, he will 
almost certainly be re-elected for a seventh term 
since he is supported by both Golkar, the 
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leading political party, and the army. However, 
as the economic downturn begins to bite, the 
political discontent is likely to mount. If millions 
of jobs disappear, as is predicted (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 29January1998 pl 7), and the 
vast numbers of poor become even worse off, 
people are likely to take to the streets. 
Corruption, cronyism and a history of 
commercial favours to Suharto's family will feed 
popular resentment against the leader. 
Impact on Timor 
According to Nobel prize winner, Jose Ramos-
Horta, 'Pro-democracy and human rights 
groups within Indonesia are speaking out more 
and more on the issue of East Timor, linking the 
oppression there to that which exists under 
Suharto.' There was, he said, 'a distinct change 
of perception, coupled with a new political will 
to address the East Timor conflict. Clear 
eviden!=e of this comes from the dedicated 
efforts throughout the year by the UN secretary-
general, Kofi Annan, and his special represen-
tative on East Timor,Jamsheed Marker, as well 
as the attention given to the issue by South 
Africa's president, Nelson Mandela.' 
It would be difficult, even for Suharto, to 
disregard the recommendations of someone of 
Mandela's stature. Indeed, exchanges between 
the two during Suharto's recent visit to South 
Africa are believed to have been encouraging 
for the East Timorese cause, although precise 
details remain under wraps. Mandela has also 
called for the release and involvement in talks of 
East Timor's resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao. 
Ramos-Horta was inspired by Mandela's 
involvement to appeal to the Tirnorese resistance 
to refrain from further violence. 
Rights abuses 
However, since the resolution on Indonesia was 
passed at the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) in April 1997, there 
have been more human rights violations in East 
Timor. The UN's special rapporteur on torture 
has not been invited to East Timor, as was 
recommended, nor has any ground been made 
in establishing an on-site human rights 
monitoring team. Similarly, there has been no 
reduction in the numbers oflndonesian troops 
in the territory. 
The momentum for change established in 
1997 - by Britain on the diplomatic front, and 
by the US government on arms sales - must be 
kept up. With Britain holding the presidency 
of the European Union in the first half of 1998, 
Europe-based activists should press the British 
foreign secretary, Robin Cook, to continue 
playing a constructive role, and should try to 
maximise the use of the EU Common Position 
on East Tim or (see box on page 6). The 
proposed visit to East Timor by British, Dutch 
and Austrian ambassadors should happen as 
soon as possible, preferably before the 
UNCHR's 54th session starts on 16 March. 
Meanwhile, governments and international 
financial institutions could make any future 
rescue deals for Indonesia dependent on 
political reforms to encourage greater 
democracy, improve human rights, and establish 
accountability. • 
Summary 
This issue of Timor Link reflects on the crisis 
which has hit the Indonesian economy at the 
beginning of 1998 and the threat it poses to 
President Suharto's rule. The deeper the 
economic downturn, the greater the chances 
of social unrest, and the possibility of 
political movement over East Timor. 
We argue that any financial rescue packages 
for Indonesia should be tied to guarantees 
of political refonn and improvements in 
human rights. 
Also in this issue, medical student Rachel 
Foster reports on the failings of the 
Indonesian government's health system in 
East Timor, and Sharon Scharfe examines 
Canada's anns export policy and the 
country's increasing profde among those 
lobbying for change. Hugh Dowson reports 
on the latest developments in attempts to lift 
the veil on the Balibo killings and we reprint 
Bishop Belo's appeal at the All-inclusive 
Intra-East Timorese Dialogue, and Cardinal 
Basil Hume's statement on the anniversary 
of the invasion of East Timor. 
REPORTS FROM EAST TIMOR 
Failing health 
East Timor has one of the highest 
incidences of tuberculosis in the world. 
Many people die of malaria, malnutrition is 
widespread, and diarrhoea, chest 
infections and intestinal parasites cause 
great suffering. By meeting patients, 
doctors and healthcare workers, a group of 
medical students from Glasgow University, 
Scotland, saw first hand the failure of the 
Indonesian government's health services, 
and witnessed the efforts of some 
individuals to improve things. RACHEL 
FOSTER, one of the students, reports. 
The fact that people in East Timor travel huge distances to receive care at Catholic clinics 
rather than attend the puskesmas (government 
clinics) in their \~Hages illustrates the widespread 
lack of trust there is of government services. This 
may be prompted by cases of enforced contra-
ception and other human rights violations, 
although we did not see evidence of such 
extreme malpractice. 
Fear 
However, we did see that a failure to explain 
treatments, especially family planning practices, 
undermines trust and breeds fear, particularly 
among East Timorese women. This lack of trust 
creates a \'icious circle. The puskesmasoften run 
out of medicine, or hand out medicine that is 
ineffective, such as antibiotic courses that are 
too short or drugs that are out of date. So people 
use the government health services only as a last 
resort. Ofte n pa ti en ts die in puskesmas or 
hospitals. 
Drought brings 
threat of famine 
Hunger is again threatening lives in East 
Timor as drought compounds the legacy of 
the Indonesian occupation 
Jose Ramos-Horta has appealed for interna-tional assistance as famine takes hold in parts 
of East Timor. The Nobel laureate said the food 
supply on the north coast of the territory is under 
threat from the drought which has been affecting 
the region for months. Famine could set in if 
the rains fail, putting tens of thousands of people 
at risk. Already farmers ha,·e been drawing on 
seed stocks for food, which will leave them short 
for planting. 
The island of Atauro, 20 km north of Dili, and 
neighbouring Kambing Island, both home to 
around 7,000 people, are badly affected. Food 
shortages ha,·e developed in the past three 
months. with aid workers reporting that people 
are becoming lethargic from hunger, and schools 
closing earlv because the pupils are half starving. 
Ko111pas reported (28 January 1998) that 10 
t<>ns of rice were deli\'ered to Atauro island in 
2 
Compassion and resources 
Most doctors \\'orking in puskes111as are non-
Timorese, doing a three year tour of duty after 
graduating from medical school. They have no 
experie nce, limited resources and little 
knowledge of the local language and culture, 
but are given sole responsibility for the clinics. 
Desp ite this un e m·iable position , some 
Indonesian doctors showed a blatant lack of 
compassion. For example, only the help of a 
neighbour and visiting doctor saved the life of 
one woman we saw, who, bleeding severely after 
giving birth at home, was refused treatment at 
Dili hospital. 
Until recently, there were no Timorese doctors 
working in East Timor but now there are 14 
practising and five soon to graduate from medical 
school. They are trusted and appreciated, even 
when they work within the government system. 
Scholarships to train more Timorese doctors 
would greatly improve the situation. 
Despite looking impressive, many puskesmas 
lack human and material resources, although 
this does not appear to be due to a lack of funding. 
Money seemed to be leaking out of the system at 
every level, whereas Catholic clinics, which receive 
their medicines from overseas donors, were better 
stocked and sometimes helped the puskesmaswith 
supplies. On the other hand, two Catholic clinics 
we visited borrowed staff from the puskesmas. One 
had no trained sisters of its own, but patients were 
happv to be treated by puskesmasstaffwithin the 
Catholic clinic. 
Puskesmas are given incentives to carry out 
certain programmes, such as the family planning 
programme, and immunising children, and con-
sequen th· tend to concentrate on these tasks 
rather than on treating malaria or dealing with 
infections and heart attacks. 
response to the crisis. The paper reported on 
10 February that the US had donated US$25,000 
to help with the shortage. This is likely to be 
spent on corn seeds, medicines, rice, sugar, 
cooking oil, soap and other basics. 
The Indonesian government is already hard 
pressed, responding to droughts and food 
shortages elsewhere. The Far Eastern Economic 
Review (FFER) reports drought claiming more 
than 1,000 lives in lrian Jaya, with a further 
800,000 at risk. Cases of malaria have risen, exac-
erbating the situation still further. 
The immediate cause of the problem is El 
Nino, the Pacific Ocean current which has been 
affecting the climate around the world. Food 
crops have been severely affected, even destroyed 
in some areas. According to FFER (December-
January 1998), economists predict that millions 
of Indonesians will be 'dragged back below the 
poverty line ', with malnutrition and infant 
mortality increasing in Eastern Indonesia. 
With economic crisis already ravaging 
livelihoods in East and South East Asia, the 
drought could take a particularly heavy toll on 
the East Timorese rural economy, where food 
production, traditionally of maize and rice, was 
se\'erely affected by the Indonesian occupation. 
Traditional beliefs 
There is little health education work, apart from 
heavy advertising campaigns for immunisation 
and contraception, so people sometimes fail to 
seek help when they should because traditional 
beliefs about a certain disease tell them they are 
bound to die. But people could be taught in their 
own language about health issues and the use of 
modern and traditional remedies. Educating 
women in particular has been recognised as a 
key to imprm~ng the health of the comm unit\'. 
One Catholic clinic used ' motivators' 
(Timorese women working as health workers) to 
try to take the limited health care resources to 
the people who need them most. Put in charge 
of about 20 families in a community, the women 
have no responsibility for administering 
medicine - which attracts unwanted attention 
from the military who think they are assisting 
Fretilin - but they do look out for malnourished 
children or infections and bring them to the 
attention of the clinic. These women could also 
provide effective health education. 
Because of its trusted position, the Catholic 
church could meet some of the social and 
medical needs of the people, but Jack of organ-
isation and a reluctance to change are preventing 
it from doing more. There have been teams of 
visiting specialists who try to tackle surgical cases 
which fall outside the healthcare system. 
Ultimately, however, East Timor's health system 
will only improve with a change in the wider 
political situation. • 
Medical students from the University of Glasgow 
visited East Timar in August 1997. They visited a 
'puskesmas', the government hospital and a Catholic 
clinic in the capital, Dili, and travelkd to rnral viUages, 
where they ta/Red to local and Indonesian doctors. 
The invasion saw families moved off their 
traditional farmlands and away from their 
livelihoods. Population growth as a result of 
Indonesia's transmigration policy has also meant 
that indigenous Timorese have been moved 
away from the best land, and a larger population 
has to feed itself from land impoverished by war, 
deforestation and other forms of environmental 
destruction. The presence of large numbers of 
Indonesian soldiers, not themselves engaged in 
production, increases the demand for food. The 
legacy of the past 23 years is combining with 
natural catastrophe to potentially devastating 
effect.• 
Better times behind: East Timorese farmers in Suai 
during the 1996 haroest. 
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New organisation 
in East Timor 
attracts 
governor's wrath 
Members of a new group which aims to break 
the diplomatic log-jam over East Timor have 
run into resistance from the governor. 
A new organisation, called Movement for the Reconciliation and Unity of the People of 
East Timor (MRUPTL) was formed inside East 
Timor in October 1997. According to reports, it 
gathers together several East Timorese political 
leaders, including members of Apodeti, which 
originally supported integration with Indonesia 
in 1975. It appears that the inspiration behind 
MRUPTL was frustration at the limited partici-
pation and agenda of the All-inclusive Intra-East 
Timorese Dialogue (AIETD). 
Referendum 
The organisation favours a referendum on the 
future of East Timor, and is headed up by 
Manuel Carrascalao, a brother of former East 
Timorese governor, Mario Carrascalao. As such, 
for the Apodeti members involved, it represents 
a potentially significant political shift, since 
many of them were perceived as close to the 
Indonesian military, and enjoyed government 
positions after 1975. Carrascalao himself was a 
member of Golkar, the dominant Indonesian 
political party. 
The secretary of MRUPTL, Francisco 
Carvalho , a former private secretary to the 
governor, has said that the new organisation is 
a 'moral movement aimed at uniting the people 
of East Timor', since throughout the 21 year 
integration, ' the government has fai led to unite 
the people'. The organisation apparently hoped 
to enter into dialogue with the administration, 
the armed forces and other bodies, seeking the 
best possible solution for East Timor. 
Criticism 
Not surprisingly therefore, it has already drawn 
fierce criticism from governor Abilio Osorio 
Soares, who has allegedly called for the arrest 
of some of its members. 
In an interview with the Portuguese daily, 
Publico, Carrascalao defends his stance. Asked 
why the MRUPTL was established, he said that 
the Indonesians had worked through terror 
tactics, which had caused only unhappiness 
amongst Timorese. The organisation aimed to 
resolve the East Timorese impasse by fostering 
unity. It was reported in the Jakarta Post of 5 
January that Bishop Belo has urged the 
government of Indonesia to dialogue with the 
group . However, the authorities appear to 
remain sceptical. 
Meanwhile, Carrascalao has appealed to 
the United Nations to send an independent 
team to evaluate the new organisation's political 
stance. • 
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EAST TIMOR: Time for change 
Timor, area 7 ,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West T1mor 
to journalists and on 7 December it launched 
a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encouragement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Timor was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Tunor 
has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority of Tonorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Timorese for self-determination and an armed 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Timor's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Tonor's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Timor by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Timor, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians during a funeral procession held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East Tonorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre 
provided in~utable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pres.mre 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese under the auspices of the UN. 
3 
ANALYSIS 
Canadian policy on East Timor: All talk? 
In the ear1y 1980s Canada voted against UN 
General Assembly resolutions on East Timor. 
But in recent years it has slowly become 
more proactive, and in 1997 Canada 
became more outspoken than ever on the 
issue. SHARON SCHARFE, Secretary of 
Par1iamentarians for East Timor, reports. 
in\'olving all parties 
• contributing Can$30,000 towards the UN-
sponsored All Inclusive Intra-East Timorese 
Dialogue (AIETD) , in October 
• Axworthy mee ting UN secre tary-general , 
Kofi Annan, for a briefing on UN progress 
on East Timor, in October 
Canada's contributions to East Timor's cause 
in 1997 included: 
• Canada's ambassador to the UN making a 
strong opening statement in November at 
the UN General Assembly's Third 
Committee on escalating human rights 
,fo)ations in East Timor, in which he referred 
to Canada's desire for 'a just, lasting and 
internationally-acceptable solution' for all 
parties involved 
• 
• 
• 
announc in g an all-party parliamentary 
delegation to visit Indonesia and East Timor 
to examine the human rights situation first-
hand (re-scheduled for 1998 because of the 
1997 federal election) 
together with the European Union in April, 
tabling a successful resolution on East Tim or 
at the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights (UNCHR) 
foreign minister Axworthy visiting Jakarta 
in July to tell Indonesia's President Suharto 
and foreign minister Alatas of Canada's 
concern about human rights violations in 
East Timor and its desire to see a resolution 
• continuing to be the third largest aid donor 
to East Timor, supporting many small-scale 
projects run by the Timorese. 
These initiatives, however, contrast with the 
continued sale of military goods from Canada to 
Indonesia (shown in the table) while it engages 
in genocidal actions against the peoples of East 
Timor. Although there have been no military 
export permits issued to Canadian companies 
CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS TO INDONESIA 
(Summary compiled from information obtained from Information Requests filed with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Figures in Can$) 
YEAR 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
VALUE OF PERMITS 
** 
** 
** 
$3,780,082 
Nil 
$10,000,000 
$5,506,926 
$362,380,101 
$32,285,205.86 
Jan.:June 1997 $3,250,000.00 
* For definition of Permit Numbers, see right. 
PERMIT TYPES* TOTAL VALUE OF SALES 
3 Permits: 
7005, 7011 
2 Permits: 
7010,2010 
3 Permits: 
2011, 2015 
6 Permits: 
2011, 2010, 2010 
2011 , 2011 
0 Permits 
1 Permit: 
2009 
3 Permits: 
2010,2010, 2010 
6 Permits: 
2010, 2010, 2014 
2009,2010,2005 
5 Permits: 
2010, 2010, 2006 
2014, 2010 
4 Permits: 
2010,2010,2011 
2010 
** 
** 
** 
$580,963 
Nil 
$0,00 
$1,244,042 
$0,00 
$1,638,426.00 
(Not yet known) 
**Note : :\n Access to Information request was filed with DFAIT on 28 April 1995, regarding 
Canadian military export permits for goods destined to Indonesia for the period 1975-95. The 
department responded that data retrieval on the issuance of export permits was computerised 
in October 1988; collection of information on actual export sales of military goods was system-
atised in 1990. Earlier records are less reliable. The 20 permits of which records are available 
together total Can$22,256,369. In general, the value of actual sales normally represents only a 
fraction of the \'alue of permits issued; the ratio is often as low as 10 per cent. 
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since the Dili Massacre in 1991 , and will not be 
for as long as Indonesia remains in East Timor, 
it is still incongruent for Canada to express 
concern over human rights violations while 
co ntinuing to supply the perpetrators with 
military goods. Currently Canadian military 
goods sold to Indonesia are primarily to replace 
parts on equipment that was sold in the past, 
with the Indonesian navy being the primary 
purchaser of such goods. Their value in total 
bilateral trade is minimal. 
Canada's foreign minister should make it his 
policy to disallow further exports of military 
goods to Indonesia so long as Indonesia remains 
illegally in East Timor, in violation of two UN 
Security Council resolutions and eight General 
Assembly resolutions. Halting all future exports 
of military goods to Indonesia would allow 
Canada to advocate similar action and gain 
support from its allies. Only through a concerted 
international effort, in conjunction and 
cooperation with the UN, will the peoples of 
East Timor finally realise their inherent right to 
self-determination . • 
MILITARY PERMIT NUMBER - DEFINITION 
Military 
Export 
Penn it 
Number 
7005 
7010 
7011 
Category Description 
Fire control, and related alerting and 
warning equipment, and related systems 
specially designed for military use , and 
specially designed components. 
Aircraft and helicopters, unmanned. 
Electronic equipment specially designed 
for military use, and specially designed 
components. 
NOTE: New categorisation system begins in 1989, 
2005 
2006 
2009 
2010 
Fire control radars, range finding 
sensors, ball istic computers and related 
alerting and warning equipment specially 
designed for military use, and parts and 
components. 
Vehicles and related equipment specially 
designed or modified for military use, 
and specially designed components. 
Military vessels and specially designed 
parts and components such as engines, 
navigation systems and sonar equipment. 
Military aircraft and helicopters, 
including transport aircraft, aero-
engines, parachutes and related parts 
and components. 
2011 Electronic equipment for military use 
such as communications equipment and 
radar systems. 
2014 Specialised equipment for military 
training or for simulating military 
scenarios, such as computerised trainers, 
aircraft and vehicle simulators, 
components and accessories. 
2015 Imaging or imaging countermeasure 
equipment, including photographic, 
thermal imaging equipment and 
specially designed components. 
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DIPLOMACY /CHURCHES 
Bishops call for ceasefire 
The Third All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese 
Dialogue (AIETD) took place in Austria in 
late October 1997. As usual, political 
questions were precluded from the agenda 
and participants from East Timor were 
under heavy pressure from the Indonesian 
military not to rock the boat. As usual, 
participants had difficulty agreeing a 
statement, although the bishops of East 
Timor submitted the following strong 
statement, calling for a ceasefire and an 
end to torture by the Indonesian armed 
forces. 
This is what the bishops' statement said. 
Appeal 
We, the Bishops of East Timor, resolute in our desire to preserve and defend the 
martyred people of East Timor against the 
scourge of war, which twice in the space of a 
human li fe has brought us horrors and 
individual su ffering, and profoundly 
conscious of 
• our faith in fundamental human rights and 
in the dignity and value of the human person 
• the obligation of governments of states to 
establish the necessary conditions for the 
maintenance of justice and peace, freedom, 
tolerance, of solidarity and of economic 
development and social progress 
Diplomatic round-up 
Tripartite Talks 
A third round of talks at ambassadorial level took 
place between the governments of Portugal and 
Indonesia on 7 November 1997. The talks were 
chaired by UN secretary-general Kofi Annan 's 
special representative,Jamsheed Marker. 
ThirdAIETD 
The third All-inclusive Intra-East Timorese 
Dialogue took place in Krumbach, Austria, from 
20-23October1997. The dialogue is regarded 
by the UN as complemen tary to the Tripartite 
Talks, and not a parallel negotiating track. The 
AIETD provides, in the words of jamsheed 
Marker, 'a unique forum for the East Timorese 
to make practical contributions to the search 
for a solution '. 
Attending the meeting were five new East 
Timorese participants, including two women, 
bringing the number of women participants to 
three. Ines Almeida presented two reports on 
the violation of women's rights in East Timor. 
The final communique from the meeting, which 
had dealt mainly with a proposal for a cultural 
centre, referred to the need for the protection of 
the rights of women and young people. The final 
declaration noted that the name, objectives, 
organic structure and founding sources for the 
Centre for Culture and Development Timor 
Lorosae had been agreed. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the guarantee of respect, on the part of all 
states, of the obligations incumbent on good 
neighbourly relations between peoples and 
nations 
the urgency and necessity of adopting 
effective and commonly acceptable ways, by 
peaceful means, to develop peace initiatives 
in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law 
developing friendly relations between 
nations, in this globalising world, with the 
basic principle of mutual respect, respect 
for the equality of rights, respect for se lf-
determination, and the independence of 
peoples 
promoting national, regional and interna-
tional cooperation aimed towards the 
resolution of economic, social, cultural and 
humanitarian problems 
stimulating respect for rights, for freedoms, 
and fundamental guarantees for all, without 
distinction as to race , sex, language or 
religion 
guaranteeing, by the acceptance of 
principles and the institution of methods, 
that force is not resorted to, and 
establishing an atmosphere of religious 
freedom, of the freedom of assembly and 
to organise free from censure, or political 
and military oppression, where the human 
person's inalienable rights and dignity would 
be respected and assuming, fully, 
• the values of freedom ,justice, peace and of 
tolerance and reconciliation 
• the defence of the primacy of the human 
person against all alienation 
We appeal, 
1. That through this third AIETD under the 
auspices of the United Nations 
a) the armed forces of the republic of 
Indonesia (ABRI) and the groups of East 
Timorese favourable to integration; and 
b) the armed forces of liberation of East 
Timor (Falintil) and Timorese groups 
which defend self-determination and 
independence; 
between them , opt for a d efi niti ve 
ceasefire, so as to create the means and 
necessary confidence for a just, compre-
hensive and globally acceptable solution 
for the question of East Timor; 
2. To the government oflndonesia to instruct 
elements of the armed forces stationed in 
East Timor, to obey the law, and definitive-
ly to cease torture in prisons, a practice which 
is diametrically opposed to the principles of 
Pancasila. 
Carlos Filipe X Belo SDB 
Apostolic Administrator of Dili 
Krumbach, Austria, 23 October 1997 
Statement by Cardinal Basil Hume on the 22nd anniversary 
of the invasion of East Timor 
During his visit to London this year Bishop 
Belo, apostolic administrator of Dili, East 
Timor, and Nobel laureate, spoke movingly of 
the plight of his people after 22 years of 
Indonesian rule. His overriding concern was 
that there can be no solution to the problem 
of East Timor while the people of that 
country live under occupation. The sense of 
threat from the occupying forces needs to be 
lifted, he said, by their 'drastic reduction, 
even complete withdrawal'. 
He spoke constructively about the means of 
finding the way forward. He stressed the need for 
respect for the dignity of the human person and 
of peoples. He underlined how important it is 
that the United Nations is permitted to play its 
full and proper role in helping to create a non-
threatening environment in which confidence 
can grow. Above all, he called for a dialogue, a 
willingness on all sides for change, and a spirit of 
reconciliation. I heartily support Bishop Bela's 
efforts for peace and justice. 
Sadly, I understand that since Bishop Bela's 
visit here there has not been any discernible 
* For an in-depth analysis of the meeting, Tim or 
Link readers are ref erred to Ines Almeida 's report, 
avail,abfR on the website of ETRA, Australia, 
http://www.Pactok.net.au.au/docs/et • 
improvement. Violence has been used by both 
sides. I have been informed that only two weeks 
ago soldiers fired on unarmed students in Dili, 
severely injuring three. The spirit of reconcilia-
tion requires respect for human rights, and an 
end to violence on all sides, which Bishop Belo 
and others have recently called for. Arms supplies 
to Indonesia require particular attention. Bishop 
Belo said: 'Restrict still further the condition 
under which such trade is permitted.' 
I welcome recent moves by the Britis 
government to review its trade and arms sale 
policy and hope that internationally this, an 
other measures, will be pursued. I welcom 
efforts to raise Christian awareness in this coun 
and other western countries of the situation i 
East Timor, and to promote prayer and suppo 
for the church there. And I welcome efforts t 
promote human development in East Timo 
which helps the people to participate in shapin 
their future. 
Cardinal Basil Hume 
7 December 1997 
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EUROPEAN POLICY 
UK and France put forward EU Code of 
Conduct on arms sales 
Last year the international arms trade was 
worth US$40 billion. The EU accounts for 
40 per cent of this trade. All too often, 
concerns for human rights, development 
and regional security take second place to 
economic considerations. However, the EU 
states have a chance to change this says 
STEVE SHROPSHIRE, analyst at Saferworld. 
Last May, the UK government announced 
that it would push for an EU Code of 
Conduct on arms sales which would 'set 
high common standards'. Following 
months of bilateral negotiations, the UK 
and France have now drawn up a joint 
proposal for such a Code. The proposal has 
been circulated to the other member states 
and will be formally discussed by the 
Council of Ministers before being agreed at 
the General Affairs Council in May 1998. 
The preamble to the Code sets out its aims as being to increase transparency and 
restraint. The proposal is a step forward and 
is, therefore, a welcome move. However, the 
principles of transparency and restraint are 
not clearly borne out in the current proposal. 
Moreover, there are a number of loopholes in 
the export guidelines. The proposal needs 
straightening if the Code is to meet its 
objectives. 
Consultation mechanisms 
The proposal contains some basic consultation 
mechanisms for when one member state wishes 
to export equipment for which a licence has been 
denied by another member state. However, noti-
fication of an intention to undercut is limited to 
bilateral consultations between the member state 
issuing the denial and the member state seeking 
to grant the same licence. This will do little to 
facilitate the development of 'high common 
standards' . Consultation should be multilateral. 
Export guidelines 
The guidelines expand on the eight common 
EU criteria agreed in 1991-92 which take into 
account human rights, development, regional 
security and the commitments of the member 
states. Whilst being a fairly comprehensive 
expansion of these criteria, the Code says only 
that these guidelines should be taken into 
account when considering an arms sale, rather 
than clearly stating where arms should be denied, 
or when there should be a presumption of denial. 
The guidelines also contain some serious 
loopholes. For example, the human rights 
guidelines state: The attitude of recipient States 
towards relevant human rights instruments 
should also be taken into account although non-
adherence should not preclude countries from 
recei,ing arms.' The caveat that 'non-adherence 
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should not preclude countries from receiving 
arms' obviates the preceding statement of 
concern. The member states' commitment to 
human rights must be questioned if such a 
disclaimer remains. 
The guidelines are also flawed where they state 
that licences will not be granted for the export of 
'equipment which has obvious application for 
internal repression[ ... ] unless the end-use of the 
equipment is judged to be legitimate, such as 
protection of members of the security forces 
from violence' . Such a loophole would mean 
that repressive states could continue to receive 
paramilitary, police and riot control equipment, 
as long as they argue it is for the protection of 
their police forces. The meaningful protection of 
human rights should mean that equipment which 
has an obvious application for internal repression, 
should be denied to repressive regimes. 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
Despite the declared aim of increasing trans-
parency, the Code makes no reference to 
parliamentary scrutiny of arms exports. The 
lessons from the Scott Report were that a rigorous 
system of parliamentary scrutiny is needed. Such 
a system, similar to that operating in Sweden, 
should be adopted by all member states as an 
adjunct to the Code. 
Additional measures 
The proposal requires that the member states 
examine the scope for harmonising their export 
control procedures. But it does not elaborate on 
what this should involve. In this respect, it is 
essential that the member states take action to 
strengthen and harmonise end-use certification 
and monitoring procedures and establish 
effective controls over arms brokering agents. 
Controls on end use 
The BMARC scandal, when arms supposedly 
destined for Singapore were re-exported to Iran, 
demonstrated the need for effective end-use 
controls and monitoring. Current procedures 
for establishing and monitoring end-use within 
the EU are woefully inadequate. A rigorous 
system would be one where the end-use 
agreement has the status of a legally binding 
contract. It should include a clause which would 
result in the breaking of the contract if the goods 
are found to have been used for proscribed 
purposes. 
A system of follow-up checks should also be 
provided to ensure that exported goods remain 
with their stated end user and are not diverted for 
proscribed purposes. These checks could be 
carried out by consular officials. 
Third party.brokering 
The problems of arms brokers have been well 
documented. NGOs, including Amnesty and 
Oxfam, are particularly concerned with the issue 
of brokering, which in many countries, including 
the UK, allows individuals in effect to circumvent 
national laws on arms exports. This was 
highlighted when UK based firm Mil Tee, 
registered in the Isle of Man, evaded UK controls, 
and a UN arms embargo, to broker a deal for 
light weapons and ammunition to Rwanda during 
the genocide. 
Accordingly, there should be no entities which 
are exempt from export licensing obligations. 
Brokers that contravene the export control laws 
of the country in which they are based should 
be prosecuted, whether or not the arms pass 
through EU territory. Member states should also 
establish a central register of all brokering agents. 
Next steps 
Whilst the proposal is not as rigorous as hoped 
for, other member states may table parallel 
proposals which could strengthen the Code . 
Indeed, the UK Foreign Office has indicated that 
it would welcome this. The Italian government 
has already drafted a proposal calling for an 
annual review of the Code's implementation. In 
addition, given the Belgian government's refonns 
of national legislation pertaining to arms 
brokering agents, NGOs are looking to the 
Belgian government to table a proposal in this 
area. 
An EU Code will be agreed by the end of the 
UK's EU presidency. This should not be seen as 
the end of the process. NGOs across Europe are 
already gearing up to re-focus their efforts on 
monitoring their governments' arms export 
practices to see how they implement the Code; 
pushing for additional measures such as those 
outlined above; and calling on the EU to use the 
Code as a building block for a wider interna-
tional code of conduct. 
• A full critique of the UK/France Code 
proposal, published by Amnesty International's 
International Secretariat, Amnesty Interna-
tional UK Section, BASIC, Oxfam and 
Saferworld is obtainable from Saferworld at 
33 Alfred Place, London WCIE 7DP. 
EU Common Position 
EU Policy on East Timur: Fulfilling the potential 
of the Common Position, by Eilis Ward, argues 
that the EU Common Position can provide 
a solid framework for progressive change 
in the territory, and recommends using the 
policy to promote a peaceful settlement. 
Copies are available from tbe Ea.st Timor 
Project, c/oCDJl, Unit3, CauonburyYard, 
190aNew orthRoad.LondonNl 7Bj, 
UK. Fax; +441718590017. 
&mail: clirlooOgn.apc.org 
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Beyond Balibo 
When President Suharto arrives in London 
in April, the British government has an 
opportunity to raise questions about the 
murder of British newsmen Brian Peters 
and Malcolm Rennie by Indonesian forces 
at Balibo, East Timor, on 16 October 1975. 
HUGH DOWSON reports on the latest 
developments in the Balibo case. 
Mrs Wilhelmina Rennie (Malcolm Rennie's mother) and I flew to Australia 
in October 1997 for a seminar organised by 
the Australian Section of the International 
Commission of Jurists (ASIC]). The meeting, 
'Balibo and Beyond', examined the death of 
freelance pressman, Roger East, along with 
scores of East Timor civilians, at Dili wharf on 
8 December 1975, one day after Indonesian 
troops invaded East Timor. The ICJ is one of 
the world's leading legal human rights 
bodies, and for the past 22 years its Australian 
section has been trying to uncover the truth 
surrounding the death of East and five others 
at Balibo. 
Twenty years after those events', said David 
Bite!, ICJ secretary-general, 'the Australian 
government commissioned a report from Mr 
Tom Sherman, former head of the National 
Crime Authority. The Sherman report, released 
in mid-1996, left unanswered many of the most 
significant questions about the deaths of the six 
journalists.' 
Eyewitness evidence 
In November 1995 the Australian government 
opted for a 'preliminary evaluation' (conducted 
by Sherman) which excluded eyewitness 
evidence indicating that the main aim of 
the attack on Balibo was to kill the journalists. 
In 1997 Dr Andrew McNaughton collected 
evidence which suggests that the attack on Balibo 
in October 1975 aimed to kill not only the 
five Australia-based newsmen, but also a 
Portuguese TV news team which, fortunately, 
had left Balibo the day before. 
However, Indonesia's ambassador to Australia 
told Mrs Rennie after the ASIC] seminar that 
his government believed the Sherman report, 
saying it showed that all six newsmen died before 
Indonesia invaded East Timor. By failing to 
refute this, the Australian government and 
opposition (which commissioned the report) 
appear to reinforce Suharto's contempt for 
human rights, press freedom and democracy. 
Silence 
Back in October 1975, Australian government 
signals intelligence (SIGINT) staff were listening 
to radio messages to and from Indonesia's covert 
military forces in East Tim or, a fact that Suharto 
knew about. Yet, after the killings, the Australian 
government only asked for 'news' of the 
newsmen 'missing' at Balibo, and Suharto saw 
this failure to denounce the murders as a 'green 
light' for genocide. 
ANALYSIS 
Cover-up 
In 1975 Australia 's Labour prime minister , 
Gough Whitlam, decided not to use SIGINT's 
information on Balibo for fear of upsetting the 
Indonesian and US governments. This cover-
up was continued by the caretaker government 
installed on 11November1975 after Governor-
Genera l Kerr sacked Whitlam, and by 
subsequent governments. Now the Australian 
government claims that it has never known the 
truth and, an Australian media blitz notwith-
standing, the truth is still hidden from the public 
and the newsmen 's families. As long as this 
continues, Indonesia's dictator \\~II continue to 
believe he has the West's full approval for his 
actions in East Timor. 
Whether the truth about Balibo was also 
hidden from the British government remains 
unclear - details of what information was passed 
to it at the time are classified. If it was, Australia 
broke the UK-USA treaty on SIGINT collabora-
tion and successive British foreign secretaries 
have misled parliament-on 23February1976, 
11 May 1976 and again in 1977, 1980 and 1995. 
On 9December1975 Robin Cook was one of 
100 MPs who urged the government to condemn 
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. Now, as 
foreign secretary, Cook has announced an 
ethical foreign policy. More openness about 
what happened in Balibo could be a marker of 
the sincerity of that statement. It would also be 
welcomed by the families of those who died. • 
The Australian ambassador in Jakarta was presented with fcrur boxes of remains, plus TV equipment and papers, on 12 November 1975 by General Sugama of BAK.IN 
(the Indonesian army s central intelligence agency). The next of kin of all five newsmen were then persuaded, in some cases by rather devious means, to allow the remains 
to be buried in Jakarta. This picture shows a single coffin that was buried in Jakarta on 5 (or 6) December 1975 in a service arranged by the Australian embassy. The 
newsmen s families were not invited and some families did not know about the burial service until much later. Photographs of the service were withheld from two families 
until 1995 and from the remaining families until 1997. The Australian government says that this was out of 'compassion '. 
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ASEM - putting people at the heart of economics 
The UK government will come under 
intense pressure to raise issues of human 
rights, democracy and workers' rights with 
Indonesia's embattled President Suharto 
when he comes to London this year for the 
second meeting of heads of government 
from Asia and Europe (ASEM II). 
Indonesian ministers and officials will be among others from 25 countries gathering 
in London in April. Economics will be top of 
th e agenda. The first Asia Europe Meeting 
(,\SDI I ), in Bangkok in 1996 , drew 
ministers from all 15 members of the 
European Union, anxious to cash in on what 
was then see n as the Asian economic 
'miracle '. Official documents stated that 'of 
foremost importance is securing an open 
environment for competition and allowing 
market economy principles to work ' . Now, 
with confide nc e in the Asian econo mies 
shattered by the currency crisis in the region , 
people's organisations and NGOs will be 
Official ASEM timetable 
1998 
urging government officials to take stock, 
broaden the ASEM dialogue and consider the 
social impact of free market policies. 
Concerns 
People's organisations are working to try to 
ensure that ASEM 
• is consultative, participatory, transparent 
and accountable 
• addresses the impact of policies on ordinary 
people, human rights and the environment; 
and 
• broadens its agenda to include governance 
and human rights issues, environmental sus-
tainability and people-centred development. 
Being heard will not be easy. An informal 
process, ostensibly with a broad scope for 
dialogue, ASEM should in theory provide ample 
opportunity for civil organisations to play a con-
structive role. But real decision-making remains 
open to an elite few: there are no formal 
mechanisms for people's organisations to 
17-18 February 
20 February 
20-21 February 
2 April 
2-3 April 
London 
London 
Singapore 
London 
London 
Senior Officials, Trade & Investment, Meeting 
Senior Officials, Foreign Affairs, Meeting 
ASEF Asia-Europe Forum on Globalisation 
Ministers' Meeting (preparatory summit) 
ASEM Business Event 
3-4 April London Second ASEM Summit 
1st Semester 98 UK Symposium on social challenges into the 21st century 
Young Leaders' Symposium Spring 1998 Austria 
May 1998 Naples ASEM Forum for Small/ Medium Enterprises 
ASEM III is set to take place in Seoul, Korea, in the year 2000. 
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Contact details 
ASEM and East Timor/lndonesia 
For further information on actions over East Timor, contact the British Coalition for East Timor. 
Phone: 01819851127. E-mail: maggie@gn.apc.org 
For further information about human rights and democracy events, contact Focus on the Global 
South in Bangkok, TNI in Amsterdam, the Burma Action Group in London or the ASEM NGO 
internet website: www.worldcom.nl/tni 
ASEM Working Parties 
UK Kathleen Armstrong, CIIR, Unit 3, Canon bury Yard, 190a New North Road, 
London N1 7BJ, UK. Phone: 44 1713540883. 
Fax: 44 171 359 0017. E-mail: ciirlon@gn.apc.org 
Netherlands Brid Brennan, Transnational Institute (TNI), Paulus Potterstraat 20, 1071 DA, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands. Phone: 31 20 662 6608. 
Fax: 31 20 675 7176. E-mail: tni-asia@worldcom.nl. 
Other contacts 
. .\mh Rutherford , One World Action, Bradley's Close, White Lion Street, London Nl 9PF, UK. 
Phone: 44 171 833 4075. Fax: 44 171 833 4102. E-mail:owa@gn.apc.org 
" 'ette Mahon, Burma Action Group, Collins Studios, Collins House, Islington Green, London 
NI 2XU. Phone: H 171 3597679. Fax: 44 1713543987. E-mail: bagp@gn.apc.org 
'.\'icola Bullard, Focus on the Global South, c/ o CUSRI, Wisit Prachuabmoh Building, 
Chulalongkorn Cni,·ersi l\ . Phyathai Road, Bangkok 10330, Thailand. Phone: 66 2 218 7363. 
Fax: 66 2 253 9976. E-mail: admin@focusweb.org 
A le;tfkt setting out the concerns of'.\:GOs and people's organisations is available on request from 
Kathleen Armstrong at CIIR (address as above). 
contribute , and their input is virtually unac-
knowledged in ASEM documents. 
In response, a coalition ofNGOs and people 's 
organisations in Asia and Europe has been 
formed to bring the people's vision into the 
process. Working parties have been set up 
among NGOs and people's organisations in 
Europe and Asia to coordinate lobbying of 
national governments and business. They will 
also organise media strategies, disseminate 
information , and stage events to throw the 
spotlight on human rights and democracy issues. 
Alongside the heads of government meeting 
in April, an NGO conference will take place in 
London from 31 March to 1 Apri l. This wi ll focus 
on trade and investment and bring together the 
results of research and analysis from groups 
throughout the ASEM countries, producing 
concrete recommendations for government and 
businesses and strategies for work towards ASEM 
III in South Korea in 2000. A people's 'vision 
statement' is being formulated to present to the 
governments at ASEM II. • 
Members of ASEM 
The Asian states involved in ASEM are 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (all 
members of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations - ASEAN) plus China.Japan 
and South Korea. The European members 
are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ire land, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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